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Title of Dissertation:  Using PSSA idea, Based on Hazard Identification, Identify 
Areas of Particular Concern to Help Mitigate the HFO Spill 
Risk in Arctic 
 
 
The Arctic shipping routes saw an increase in ship numbers in recent years, posing 
navigational safety and environmental protection challenges on IMO, Coastal States, 
Flag States, shipowners, etc. Among the environmental issues, pollution related to 
HFO is the most noticeable one. 
  
This paper gives suggestions about mitigation of HFO risk based on HFO spill hazard 
identification and combining PSSA idea. And the key finding of this paper is that, to 
better protect Arctic from HFO pollution, accidental oil spill should be emphasis, and 
based on the hazard identified (grounding, fire/explosion, hull/machinery, ice damage 
and collision) which are most likely to result in HFO spill, 3 categories of areas shall 
be focused on. They are 4 high-traffic-risk areas, 5 high-ice-risk areas and 11 
ecologically sensitive areas. In these areas, PSSA ideas could be applied to. Establish 
traffic separation scheme and precautionary areas in high-traffic-risk areas to reduce 
accident risks of collision, grounding, etc. Adopt pilot and icebreaker assistance, 
designate anchorage area and set mandatory speed limitation in high-ice-risk areas to 
reduce ice damage. Establish areas to be avoided for specific type or tonnage of ships 
to protect ecologically sensitive areas. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1   Background Information 
The Arctic area is attracting the attention of the international community, for the 
changing climate, economic value and nature resource. In the recent 20 years, with the 
global warming, the Arctic sea ice is melting rapidly and ice extent is shrinking, so 
viable trans-Arctic shipping routes will become increasingly available for longer 
periods of the year. Model simulations for the 21st century (using Global Climate 
Models) indicate a summer ice-free Arctic Ocean by 2050, a future scenario of great 
significance for Arctic shipping and offshore development (Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment 2009 Report [AMSA, 2009], P. 92). This scenario is promising since the 
economic value of Arctic shipping route makes it under the spotlight, on account of 
the nearly 40% shortened distance compared to traditional Asia-Europe shipping route 
and Asia-America shipping route (China Classification Society [CCS], 2016). In 
addition, the Artic area is rich in nature resources like oil, natural gas, minerals. 
The proven oil reserves account for 13% of the world reserves and nature gas account 
for 30% of the world reserves (United States Geological Survey [USGS], 2008). The 
Arctic is on the verge of a new era of exploiting nature resources.  
 
However, ships operating in Arctic areas have faced with additional risks arising from 
ice, extremely cold weather and other harsh conditions, given the unique geographical 
location and special environmental conditions in Arctic. The additional risks pose 
threats not only on navigation safety, but also on the unique and fragile environment, 
which once destroyed would be difficult to resume. Moreover, the ships operating in 
Artic use more heavy fuel oil (HFO) than distillate fuel or liquified natural gas (LNG) 
for cost concern, regardless of HFO do more damage to Arctic environment than other 
fuel oil due to its characteristics.  
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To deal with the safety and environment risks, international community has taken steps: 
from international level, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted 
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), from regional 
level, Arctic countries strengthened maritime cooperation and signed legally binding 
agreements on Arctic maritime safety, and from national level, the coastal states Russia 
and Canada recently amended national regulation associated with Arctic shipping.  
 
However, if compare the environmental protection in Arctic with Antarctic, the weak 
link of Arctic environmental protection will be exposed. The Arctic is currently less 
protected by international law compared to the Antarctic (Polar Code Hazard 
Identification Workshop, 2011). On the HFO issue, there is an absence of regulation 
in Arctic while HFO is prohibited in Antarctic under The International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Chapter 9 regulation 43.  
 
In recent years, states like Canada and the US1 and Non-Government Organizations 
(NGO) such as the Clean Arctic Alliance2 and Hurtigruten3are calling for a phase-out 
of the use of HFO by ships in a timely manner and urge IMO to advance this goal. In 
April 2018, Maritime Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) 72nd session 
                                                   
1 Canada and the US announced a joint “phase down” of HFO from their respective Arctic regions. Both 
countries had formally notified the IMO that a “heavy fuel oil spill in the Arctic could cause long-term 
damage to the environment”. 
 
2  The Clean Arctic Alliance is made up of 18 not-for-profit organizations committed to phasing out the 
use of HFO as marine fuel in the Arctic:  
Alaska Wilderness League | Bellona | Clean Air Task Force | Danish Ecological Council | ECODES | 
Environmental Investigation Agency | European Climate Foundation | Friends of the Earth US | Greenpeace 
| Iceland Nature Conservation Association | Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union | Ocean 
Conservancy | Pacific Environment | Seas at Risk | Stand.earth | Surfrider Foundation Europe | Transport & 
Environment | WWF 
 
3 These two NGOs lunched a new initiative named Arctic Commitment at the Arctic Frontiers conference 
in January 2017. The Arctic Commitment has already been signed by more than 80 parties and recently 
signed by the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, Germany. 
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considered the development of measures to reduce risks of use and carriage of HFO 
by ships in Arctic waters. In addition, as the implementation of 0.5% global fuel 
Sulphur cap in 2020, the cost to switch all ships in the Arctic fleet from HFO to 
distillate would be much less in 2020 and 2025, as HFO is expected to represent only 
7% of the fuel used by ships in the Arctic (Biswajoy & Comer, 2017), which means 
the Sulphur cap policy would minimized the difficulties in cost aspect. The trend of 
ban on HFO in Arctic seems to be clear, although there might be a long decision-
making and gradually implementing process.  
 
1.2   Review of Previous Research 
HFO in Arctic is primarily studied by 3 organizations: IMO, Maritime Environment 
Protection Committee (PAME) and International Council on Clean Transportation 
(ICCT). And Det Norske Veritas (DNV) participates in both IMO and PAME’s study. 
PAME’s study mainly emphasizes on the carriage and use of HFO, as well as the risk 
of HFO in Arctic. Three phases of Heavy Fuel in the Arctic Reports are the research 
achievement. ICCT focus on the harm of HFO in Arctic and call for a ban. A series of 
papers, reports provide data revealing the wide use of HFO in different types of ships 
and evaluating alternatives from economy aspect.  
 
1.3   Terms Definition 
1.3.1   Arctic Delimitation 
For use in this study，the Arctic area uses the same definition as used in the Polar Code: 
 
Arctic waters means those waters which are located north of a line from the 
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latitude 58°00′.0N and longitude042°00′.0W to latitude64°37′.0N, longitude 035°
27′.0W and thence by a rhumb line to latitude 67°03′.9N, longitude 026°33′.4W 
and thence by a rhumb line to the latitude 70 °49 ′ .56N and longitude 008 °
59′.61W(SΦrkapp, Jan Mayen) and by the southern shore of Jan Mayen to 73°
31′.6N and 019°01′.0E by the Island of BjΦrnΦya, and thence by a great circle 
line to the latitude 68°38′.29 N and longitude 043°23′.08E(Cap Kanin Nos) and 
hence by the northern shore of the Asian Continent eastward to the Bering Strait 
and thence from the Bering Strait westward to latitude 60°N as far as Ⅰl’pyrsiy and 
following the 60 th North parallel eastward to latitude 60°N as far as and including 
Etolin Strait and thence by the northern shore of the North American continent as 
far south as latitude 60°N and thence eastward along parallel of latitude 60°N, to 
longitude 056°37′.1W and thence to the latitude 58°00′.0N, longitude 042°00′.0W 
(Polar Code, 2014). 




Figure 1-The Delimitation of Arctic Area 
Source: Biswajoy & Comer. (2017). Alternatives to heavy fuel oil use in the Arctic: Economic and 
environmental trade-offs 
 
1.3.2   Arctic Shipping Routes 
There are two navigable routes in Arctic waters: Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the 
Northwest Passage (NWP) like it is shown in figure 2.  
 
NSR is from Iceland in the west, through Barents Sea, eastward along the northern 
seas of Eurasia to Bering Strait. This route is mostly within in Exclusive Economic 
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Zone (EEZ) of Russia's northern border, from Murmansk to Provideniya, 2,600 
nautical miles. It is opened in 1931 for domestic shipping exclusively. In the year 1991, 
Russia opened this route for international traffic. Japan and Norway were two of first 
few to begin utilizing the route. So far, this route is mainly used by Russia ships. 
 
NWP runs through an archipelago of islands in northern Canada, from Davis Strait 
and Baffin Bay in the east to Bering straits in the west, linking the Pacific Ocean and 
Atlantic Ocean through the northern coast of North America. 
 
  
Figure 2-The Arctic Routes 
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Source: AMSA, 2009 
 
1.3.3   HFO 
The MARPOL AnnexⅠhas described the characteristics of HFO when making special 
requirements for the use and carriage of oil in the Antarctica. In this paper, HFO is 
defined as the oil which has the equivalent characteristics specified by the IMO: 
 crude oil having a density, at 15°C, higher than 900 kg/m3;  
 oil, other than crude oil, having a density, at 15°C, higher than 900 kg/m3 or 
a kinematic viscosity, at 50°C, higher than 180 mm2/s;  
 or bitumen, tar and their emulsions (MARPOL).  
 
 
1.3.4   Hazard Identification 
According to IMO’s Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) guidance documents, hazard is 
defined as a potential to threaten human life, health, property or the environment. And 
hazard identification is the first step followed by risk analysis, risk control, etc. In the 
context of HFO spill in Arctic, this paper will try to identify the potential accidents 
which can contribute to HFO spill, like grounding, collision, ice damage, etc. 
 
1.3.5   Arctic Areas of Particular Concern 
For study purpose, a concept Arctic Areas of Particular Concern (AAPC) is raised in 
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this paper. Applying Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) idea to Arctic, some 
associated measures shall be put forward, commonly navigational safety measures. 
Based on hazard identification, 3 categories of AAPCs within Arctic are identified to 
draw and implement the measures. Three categories of AAPCs are identified using 
different criteria: one is area of great ecological significance where the ecological cost 
is too high to afford if HFO spill happened, the second is areas of busy traffic and have 
higher potential of accident, the third is areas with severe ice regime thus ships are 
more likely to be faced with ice damage. AAPCs can also function as a reminder to 
raise mariners environmental protection awareness.  
 
1.4   Objective of Study 
The primary purpose of this paper is to identify significant areas that shall be 
emphasized on when consider reducing the HFO accidental spill risk. The secondary 
purpose is to offer some suggestions and measures targeting at hazards in different 
AAPCs as transitional measures before HFO is prohibited in Arctic. 
 
1.5   An Outline of Chapter Organization 
This paper consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 give an overview of the HFO in Arctic, 
including the use of HFO by Arctic ships, the regulation status in national and 
international levels. This Chapter emphasizes on the identifying the hazards which are 
most likely to result in HFO spill. Chapter 3 provides a summary of existing PAASs 
and analyzed its main idea. From two detailed PSSA cases, the commonly used 
measures are synthesized. Chapter 3 also explained why not designate Artic area as a 
PSSA through IMO directly. Chapter 4 is the key part of this paper, concentrating on 
the identification of AAPCs based on description of the areas’ characteristics and 
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conditions, and give some relevant suggestions. Finally, the last chapter discourses the 




CHAPTER 2: HFO in Arctic 
2.1   The Current Situation of the Use of HFO in Arctic 
2.1.1   The wide Use of HFO in Arctic Ships 
HFO is the preferred fuel of the marine transportation industry because it is widely 
available and less expensive than cleaner distillate fuels. A report from DNV, using 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) data of an entire year of 2012, has shown that 
in the total 1347 vessels operating in Arctic, 341 vessels were assumed operating on 
HFO, accounting for 28%. Note that although by far the minority of vessels are 
operating on HFO, the volume of HFO carried as fuel is far greater due to the larger 
size vessels using HFO (DNV, 2013), as figure 3 and figure 4 demonstrate. 
 
Later, a research conducted by ICCT in 2015 shows a similar result: In 2015, 2086 
Arctic ships carry 835,000 metric tons of HFO and 255,000 metric tons of distillate as 
main bunker fuel. While only 925 ships operated on HFO (44% of the Arctic ships), 




Figure 3-Proportions of Vessels Using HFO versus Distillate Fuel in the Arctic 
Source: DNV. (2013). HFO IN THE ARCTIC-PHASE 2. 
28%
72%
Number of vessels and fuel type




Figure 4-Proportion HFO versus Distillate Fuel in-board Ships in the Arctic 
Source: DNV. (2013). HFO IN THE ARCTIC-PHASE 2. 
 
2.1.2    Dominant Ship Type in Terms of Using HFO 
In Arctic, bulk carriers carried the most HFO onboard in 2015, followed by containers 
and oil tankers. The distances traveled are also counted in, because the more distances 
HFO transported by ship, the greater the oil spill risk. In terms of distance traveled, 
bulk carriers, containers and oil tankers are still the top 3. 
 
Table 1-HFO Carriage and Transport as Bunker Fuel in the Arctic, 2015 
Ship Type Fuel 
onboard (t) 





% of fuel 
transported 
HFO 827,300 76% 2,070 56% 
 Bulk carrier 247,500 22.8% 280 7.5% 
 Container 112,800 10.4% 100 2.7% 
 Oil tanker 110.700 10.2% 100 2.6% 
75%
25%




 General cargo 77,200 7.1% 110 3.1 
 Fishing Vessel 67,600 6.2% 10 0.2% 
 Chemical tanker 51,800 4.8% 0 0.1% 
Refrigerated bulk 49,700 4.6% 300 8.1% 
 Cruise 40,600 3.7% 550 14.8% 
 Service vessel 30,000 2.8% 0 0.0% 
 Vehicle 19,100 1.8% 0 0.0% 
 Tug 6,500 0.6% 0 0.1% 
 Ro-ro 5,800 0.5% 320 8.7% 
 Offshore 3,100 0.3% 120 3.2% 
Ferry-ro-pax 2,200 0.2% 10 0.1% 
 Liquefied gas 
tankers 
2,100 0.2% 160 4.4% 
 Passenger ferry 500 0.0% 20 0.6% 
 Other 200 0.0% 1 0.0% 
 Yacht - - - - 
Distillate 251,500 23% 1,490 41% 
LNG 3,800 0.4% 3 0.1% 
Nuclear   2,800 0.3% 120 3% 
Total  1,085,400 100% 3,680 100% 
Source: Comer, B., Olmer, N., Mao, X.L., Roy, B. & Rutherford, D. (2017). Prevalence of heavy fuel oil 
and black carbon in Arctic shipping, 2015 to 2025. 
 
2.2   Regulation Status of HFO in Artic  
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2.2.1   Important Regulations in Arctic Environmental Protection 
2.2.1.1   Polar Code 
Polar Code, the regulation for ships operating in Arctic and Antarctic waters, has 
entered into force on January 1, 2017, marking a milestone in addressing international 
concern about the protection of the polar environment. To achieve the goal of ship 
safety and environmental protection in polar areas, it makes more stringent 
requirements for polar ships’ technology, operation and navigation, covering almost all 
the aspects of ships sailing in polar waters. The basic structure of Polar Code is 
illustrated in Figure 5. PartⅠSafety measures, for reducing the risk for loss of lives and 
property as well as environmental risks, includes ship structure, shipbuilding, 
equipment, communication, operation, training. PartⅡpollution prevention measures 
includes pollution from oil, sewage, noxious liquid substances in bulk and garbage. So 
far, it seems that the additional environmental requirements for Arctic areas are stricter 
compared to other areas and at least can address regular discharge from normal 
operations. Unfortunately, although had been twice discussed on IMO sessions4, the 
issue of HFO in Arctic has failed to be involved in Polar CodeⅡ -A mandatory 
requirements, only making an additional guidance that ships are encouraged to apply 
regulation 435 of MARPOL Annex Ⅰwhen operating in Arctic waters thus leaving a 
huge environmental pollution risk in Arctic.  
 
                                                   
4 This issue had been discussed on DE 57th session in March 2013, according to the instructions of MSC 91st 
session. Then on MEPC 65th session in May 2013, it was argued that a little early to discuss the issue of HFO 
in Arctic. 




Figure 5-The Basic Structure of Polar Code 
 
Figure 6-Basic Structure of PartⅡ-Pollution Prevention Measures 
 
2.2.1.2   Russia’s National Legislation 
The Ministry of Transport of Russia amended RULES of navigation in the water area 
of the Northern Sea Route in January 2017 to implement the Polar Code. In terms of 
environmental protection, Russia has much lower standards than Canada. The 
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requirements to ships pertaining to the protection of the marine environment from the 
oil pollution from ships are as follows: 
 Tank or tanks capacity for the collection of oil residues should be sufficient taking 
into consideration type of ship power plant and duration of voyage in the water 
area of the Northern Sea Route6;  
 Discharge of oil residues into the water area of the Northern Sea Route is 
prohibited7. 
 
2.2.1.3   Canada National Legislation 
Aiming at extending jurisdiction and claiming sovereign rights through legislation, 
Canada has introduced the highest environmental protection standards since 
1960s and 1970s adopting Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. There are two 
regulations under the act, Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Regulations and Arctic 
Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations which was repealed by a new regulation 
Arctic Shipping Safety and Pollution Prevention Regulations in August 2017. The new 
one incorporates the Polar Code into Canada’s domestic legislation, which means, 
Canada’s national regulation is not stricter than Polar Code and failed to cover HFO.  
2.2.2   The Lack of Effective Regulation on HFO in Arctic 
The three regulations mentioned above are the most significant legislations in 
international level and national level respectively. Unfortunately, none of them cover 
the regulation of HFO. 
 
                                                   
6 RULES of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, Ⅷ. Requirements to ships pertaining to 
the safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment from the pollution from ships, Article 
61,1). 
7 RULES of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, Ⅷ. Requirements to ships pertaining to 
the safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment from the pollution from ships, Article 65. 
16 
 
In terms of Polar Code, the failure to phase out the use of HFO in Artic triggered 
dissatisfaction, though it is already banned in Antarctica. Sue Libenson, Pacific 
Environment, argued that while the Polar Code is a good step at recognizing the special 
risks of Arctic shipping, it still fails to directly address the HFO spill, which is the 
highest potential risk. John Kaltenstein, marine policy analyst, considers that the Polar 
Code doesn’t do nearly enough to tackle substantial risks posed by shipping: use of 
noxious HFO in the Arctic. 
 
Similarly, the Canada Regulation was pointed out by environmental protection 
organization for lack of habitat protection and the ban on HFO8 . Let alone Russia, 
arguing against the ban on HFO for many year, seems to be the last state willing to 
prohibit the use of HFO9. 
 
2.2.3   The Reason Why There Is an Absence of Regulation or Ban on HFO 
HFO is prohibited in Antarctic and Svalbard archipelago, but Arctic yet has not. The 
reason lies in the High Economic Cost of Switching HFO to Distillate or LNG. Table 2 
illustrates the total Arctic fleet cost of switching HFO to distillate or LNG in 2015 and 
the projection of 2020 and 2025. The total cost of switching HFO to distillate was 
59,770,320 dollars and is projected to be 4,338,746 and 5,208,624 dollars in 2020 and 
2025 representatively (it will cost less in 2020 and 2025 because of the IMO 0.5% 
global fuel S standard), while the cost of switching to LNG is negative. However, 
switching to LNG will need to retrofit the ship’s fuel and propulsion systems, in 
addition to the huge expenditure of refilling station. 
 
Table 2-Costs and Benefits of Switching from Residual Fuels to Distillate or LNG 
                                                   
8 http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2018/01/12/arctic-shipping-regulations-oceans-north-canada/, retrieved in 20 
June, 2018. 
9 Russia has the most ships operating on HFO in Arctic, consuming 56% of the total volume of HFO, making 
it the largest stakeholder in Arctic HFO. For further information see Comer et al., (2017). Prevalence of 





Source: Roy, B & Comer, B. (2017). Alternatives to heavy fuel oil use in the Arctic: Economic and 
environmental tradeoffs. 
 
Different from Antarctic, Arctic has permanent resident. The huge expenditures 
resulted from the ban on HFO will eventually be paid by the businesses in Arctic, Artic 
people and costal states, naturally leading to resistance when carrying out the regulation 
of HFO. 
 
2.3   Risk of HFO 
2.3.1   Hazard Identification 
2.3.1.1   Discharge from Normal Operation 
During normal ship operating procedures, ships may continuously or intermittently 
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discharge pollutant into water and air, such as gas emissions to air, dirty water or waste 
into sea. Clearly HFO might be discharged solely or along with ballast water, oily 
mixtures or sewage into the sea if the ships operate on HFO. But Polar Code has already 
made mandatory requirements for zero discharge of oil or oily mixtures, significantly 
reducing the oil discharge from normal operation, so it is out of the scope of this paper. 
2.3.1.2   Accidental Oil Spill 
In addition to the common hazards worldwide, like grounding, collision, fire, etc., polar 
waters introduce new hazards to oil spill, e.g., ice loads, icing freezing in etc., and add 
the common hazards’ risk level (figure 7). 
 
Figure 7-Risk Elements Worldwide versus the Arctic 
Source: DNV. (2013). HFO IN THE ARCTIC-PHASE 2. 
 
DNV report in 2013 pointed out that Arctic ship accidents potentially cause oil spill 
includes the following categories: grounding, collision, hull/machinery, fire/explosion 
and ice damage. 
 
 Grounding: Includes ships reported hard and fast for an appreciable period of 
time as well as incidents reported touching the sea bottom. This category 
includes entanglement on under water wrecks or obstructions.   
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 Collision: Striking or being struck by another ship, regardless of whether under 
way, anchored or moored. This category does not include striking under water 
wrecks. (IHS Fairplay, 2012)  
 Hull/Machinery: Includes ships lost or damaged as a result of hull/machinery 
damage or failure which is not attributable to any other categories.   
 Fire/Explosion: Where the fire and/or explosion is the first event reported 
(except where first event is a hull/machinery failure leading to fire/explosion). 
 Ice damage: This category may include ice bergs as collision hazard, ship 
pushed aground by moving ice or ice bergs as ship crush hazard (structural 
failure). 
   
2.3.2   Estimated Accident Frequencies 
Accident frequency is the number of occurrences of accidents which might induce HFO 
spill per unit time (e.g. per year). DNV has carried out an FSA under the commission 
of PAME, in which the accident frequency is estimated, shown in table 3. That is, a 
grounding accident which would cause oil spill is likely to happen every 2.8 years. 
Every 8.8 years, an oil spill would result from fire/explosion in Arctic. Ranked by 
frequency, the hazard should be grounding, Fire/explosion, hull/machinery, ice damage 
and collision.  
 
Figure 8 shows an estimated annual spill mass from different ship types. Bulk carrier, 
container and oil tanker, in addition with passenger ship, represent the highest risk of 
HFO spill, corresponding with conclusion given in 2.1.2, that the first three types of 




Table 3-Years between Likely Incident Leading to Oil Spill 
Grounding  Fir/Exp  Hull/Mach Ice Damage Collision 
2.8 years 8.8 years  10 years 39 years 70 years 




Figure 8-Estimated annual spill mass (tons)from Arctic shipping (four main accident 
modes)-bunker oil only 
Source: DNV. (2013). HFO IN THE ARCTIC-PHASE 2. 
 
2.3.3   The Risk Cost of HFO  
2.3.3.1   Environmental Cost 
HFO spill poses environmental threats, especially in ecologically sensitive areas like 
the Arctic. Viscous HFO is difficult to disperse or degrading naturally in Arctic cold 
water, thereby making HFO spills highly persistent in regions like the Arctic waters. 
The high density of HFO causes it to sink rather than float on the water surface. Sunken 
HFO can resurface during warmer seasons and wash ashore long after all surface spills 
have been cleaned up (Deere-Jones, 2016). In addition to the risks of oil spills, burning 
HFO emits Black Carbon (BC), a small, dark particle emitted as a result of incomplete 




2.3.3.2   Economic Cost 
 Economic risk is noticeable due to the high clean-up cost. Etkin (2000) estimated the 
cleaning-up cost of oil spill for a variety of fuel types, including No. 2 fuel and No. 6 
fuel, revealing that the cost of cleaning up HFO is the highest. Table 4 shows the 
estimated cleanup costs based on the World Bank (2016) MUV (Roy, 2017). Also, 
remoteness of Arctic areas may increase the clean-up cost significantly. Take the 
Selendang Ayu bulk carrier oil spill as an example. The accident happened in December 
2004, near Unalaska Island, Alaska, where 1,200 tonnes of residual fuel oil were spilled. 
Clean-up was difficult because the site and oiled shorelines were accessible only by sea 
or by air and the effort was coordinated by the Kodiak, AK, Coast Guard station more 
than 1,000 kilometers away. Total cleanup costs reached $112 million (2005 USD), or 
roughly $93,000 (2005 USD) per tonne. (Roy, 2017). For the above reasons, the AC 
has called HFO “the most significant threat from ships to the Arctic environment” (AC, 
2009). 
 
Table 4-Estimated Cleanup Costs of Fuel Oil Spill 
Fuel type Cost 
(2015 USD/tonne) 
HFO 22,441 
<0.5% S residual  16,831 
Distillate (MGO) 3,055 








CHAPTER 3: PSSA and Its Idea 
3.1   Idea of PSSA 
According to IMO, a PSSA is an area that needs special protection through action by 
IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological, socio-economic or scientific 
reasons and which may be vulnerable to damage by international maritime activities 
(IMO). At the mean time of designation of a PSSA, Associated Protective Measures 
(AMP) are adopted by IMO to prevent, reduce, or eliminate the threat or identified 
vulnerability. PSSA derives from the resolution 9 of the International Conference on 
Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention, 1978, on particularly sensitive sea area which 
invited the IMO to initiate studies with a view to assessing the need of protection, as 
well as the appropriate measures, to achieve a reasonable degree of protection and 
legitimate use of the sea10. MEPC then started the work since 23rd session in 1986 under 
the designation of IMO. At the very beginning, it only aimed at making full use of IMO 
convention to propose measures for existing marine protected areas, especially those 
areas beyond the territorial waters. 
 
In 1994, IMO held a series of meetings along with University of Hull and IMO, to 
discuss the significance of PSSA. Incorporating the conclusion of the meeting, a 
reasonable summary about the idea of PSSA might be given: 
 Firstly, providing an evaluation tool to evaluate whether the sea area is vulnerable 
and at grave risk from international shipping; 
 Secondly, adopt additional protective measures to deal with the risk from 
international shipping, commonly using navigational safety measures like ship 
routing, ship reporting, pilot assistance, etc.; 
 Thirdly, recognize the significance of the designated sea area from international 
level, thus remind mariners to pay extra attention when operate in the area. 
 
                                                   
10 Resolution A.720(17), adopted on 6 November 1991, Guidelines for The Designation of Special Areas and 
the Identification of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas. 
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3.2   General Description of Existing PSSA 
Currently, there are 17 PSSAs located all over the world. The distribution of existing 
PSSAs are shown in figure 9. Once an area is identified as a PSSA, some specific 
measures shall be established to control the maritime activities in that area thereby 
protect the environment, such as routing measures, like it is illustrated in table 5.  
 
 




Table 5-the Existing PSSAs and APMs 
PSSA Proposing 
states 





recommended pilotage system； 












recommended pilotage system； 
mandatory ship reporting system 
Sabana Cuba  1997.9 Area To Be Avoided 
24 
 
Camagüey MEPC. 74(40） 
Malpelo Columbia 2002.3 
MEPC. 97(47） 








Areas To Be Avoided; 
encouragement for seafarers to 
take particular care when 
navigating 





mandatory deep water route 
Paracas Peru 2003.7 
MEPC. 106(49） 



















Two traffic separation schemes; 
Areas To Be Avoided; 
mandatory ship reporting system 
Galapagos Ecuador  2005.7 
MEPC. 135(53） 
Area To Be Avoided; 
Two Traffic Separation Schemes; 
Mandatory ship reporting 





New traffic separation schemes; 















United States 2008.4 
MEPC. 171(57) 
Areas To Be Avoided; 
ship reporting system 
Bonifacio Italy, France 2011.7 
MEPC. 204(62) 
Mandatory ship reporting 
system; 
Recommended pilotage service; 
Recommended two-way route 
Saba Bank Netherlands 2012.10 
MEPC. 226(64) 
Area To Be Avoided; 
Mandatory No Anchoring Area 
Coral Sea Australia 2015.5 
MEPC.268(68) 
Two-way route; 













Recommended pilotage system; 
Area to be avoided 
 
 
3.3   Two Cases of PSSA 
3.3.1   Case 1-the Canary Island 
The Canary Islands lie in the equatorial Atlantic, off the coast of Africa. Very large 
crude oil tankers to and from the Persian Gulf pass through the routes near the islands. 
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And they are at the center of the Canarys Current and the Azores Current. Ship routing 
systems and compulsory reporting system are used in Canary Island to protect 
venerable environment, like it is shown in table 6 and figure 10. 
 
Table 6-The AMPs of Canary Island  




Each three miles wide, guide 
traffic between Fuerteventura, 
Gran Canaria and Tenerife 
Intensive traffic of large oil 
tankers bound for the Persian 
Gulf. These vessels sail in ballast 
along the north/south route and 
loaded the south/north route. 
Areas To Be 
Avoided 
Surround the islands of 
Lanzarote, Tenerife, Grand 
Canaria, La Palma and El Hierro, 
applying to all shipping over 500 
gross tons. 
Lanzarote, La Palma and El 
Hierro are biosphere reserve; 
Tenerife and Grand Canaria are 





Tankers of 600 deadweight tons 
carrying oil and certain other 
hydrocarbons must report to 
CANREP on entering the PSSA, 
when leaving port, anchorage or 
deviating from their planned 
route. 
It is important for monitoring its 
track and launching search and 
rescue measures, ensuring safe 
navigation and preventing 
pollution12. 
                                                   
11 MEPC. 134(53). Appendix 1. Para. 2.1. 




Figure 10-A Chartlet of the Canary Islands PSSA and Its APMs 
Source: IMO Resolution MEPC.134(53). Designation of the Canary Islands as a Particularly Sensitive 
Sea Area. 
 
3.3.2   Case 2-the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait 
Protecting the Great Barrier Reef through nature reserves and national parks has a long 
history, and the PSSA builds on earlier initiatives by the Australian Government. The 
Torres Strait area was added to the PSSA in 2005, and introduced a two-way system for 
ships passing through this shallow and hazardous channel. 
 
The area is important for fishing and tourism, and the interests of local populations are 
balanced against the need to conserve the interesting wildlife. The AMPs and chartlet 
are shown in table 7 and figure 11 respectively. 
Table 7- The AMPs of the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait 
AMPs Application Explanation 
Recommended pilotage 
system 
For large ships and carriers 
of hazardous materials. 
Parts of the Torres Strait 
are isolated, remote and 
very demanding on the 
navigator. Tidal streams 
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can be strong and 
variable13. 
Mandatory ship reporting 
system 
Apply to ships operates 
along the entire offshore 
area. 
It is important for 
monitoring its track and 
launching search and 
rescue measures, ensuring 
safe navigation and 
preventing pollution. 
Two-way route For traffic passing through 
the shallow and hazardous 
Torres Strait. 
There are narrow fairways 
and areas of converging 
traffic that present a wide 
range of ship types, 
carrying a variety of 
cargoes, including 
dangerous goods and 
potentially polluting 
materials. Ships 
navigating in this area may 
encounter concentrations 
of fishing Bessel, tourist 
vessels and recreational 
craft14. 
 
Noted that in the process of designation the Torres Strait as a PSSA, Australia and Papua 
New Guinea submitted a joint proposal seeking an extension to the existing Great 
Barrier Reef PSSA to include the waters of the Torres Strait because the number of 
ships carrying noxious substances was increasing while a declining number of ships 
following pilot regime. Therefore, the two states suggested the extension of the 
                                                   
13 MEPC. 133(53). para. 3.2. 
14 MEPC. 133(53). para. 3.3. 
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compulsory pilotage regime currently applicable in the Great Barrier Reef, to apply to 
vessels when navigating the Torres Strait and the Great North East Channel, leading to 
a series of debates between 2003 and 2005. Some states argued that there is no 
international law basis for compulsory pilotage regime. Moreover, it was a violation of 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in terms of traditional 
freedoms of navigation on straits used for international navigation. The IMO new 
resolution in 2005 recommend pilotage rather than compulsion pilotage. 
 
Figure 11-A Chartlet of the Torres Strait extension to the Great Barrier Reef PSSA 
Source: IMO res, MEPS 53/24, Designation of the Torres Strait as an extension of the Great Barrier Reef 
Particularly sensitive sea area, 22 July 2005. 
 
3.3.3   A Summary of APMs 
The chosen cases are two typical PSSAs that would provide some references to AAPCs.  
 For the sea areas where navigation conditions are complicated, e.g., tidal streams 
are variable, channels are shallow and hazardous, pilotage systems might be 
established; 
 For the sea areas where are pathway of high-risk ships, e.g., large oil tankers, ships 
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carrying dangerous goods or potentially polluting materials as cargoes, or traffic is 
intensive, traffic separation scheme is adopted; 
 In areas of ecological significance, area to be avoided, one of the elements of ship 
routing, is established; 
 For remote areas where are difficult to conduct search and rescue, compulsory ship 
reporting system is adopted. 
 
Coastal States could directly apply these APMs in AAPCs within the legal framework 
without designation as PSSA. But from the Torres Strait case, mandatory pilotage might 
cause legal controversy. 
3.4   Why AAPC instead of PSSA 
3.4.1   PAAS has a Problem of Long Process 
It would be a long procedure for IMO to adopt a PSSA, going through the assessment, 
review and re-evaluation. For example, Denmark, Finland and Germany submitted the 
proposal of designation Baltic Sea as a PSSA in December 2003, and the resolution of 
designation Baltic Sea as PSSA was adopted in 2005, two years later. Similarly, it took 
2 years to adopt the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait as a PSSA. According to the 
accident frequency mentioned above, every 2.8 years there would be an accident 
resulting oil spill. That is to say, Arctic is at HFO spill risk all the time. it would be risky 
to take so long a period waiting for the adoption. 
 
The use of HFO might be gradually banned in the future. From this point of view, the 
measure discussing in this paper would be a transitional measure, in sore need of rapid 
implementation. Too long a process would make it irrelevant. 
 
3.4.2   The Problem of Delimitation 
If designating Arctic as a PSSA, the main problem to be confronted is how to identify 
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the size of the PSSA area. Given the ecological continuity of Artic, as well as the 
discrete and widely distributed sensitive areas, the whole Arctic shall be designated as 
one PSSA, which would make the PSSA the largest one in the world and might trigger 
controversy. The Western European PSSA carries a strong warning. The large extent of 
the first proposal was questioned by a number of States, and some argued that 
consideration should have been given to proposing a number of smaller PSSAs within 
the area. Finally, some concessions were made by Norway to reduce the size of the area 
east of Shetland Isles (Julian Roberts, 2007). Figure 12 illustrates the original and 
changed boundaries. Arctic is faced with a more difficult question if proposed as a 
PSSA, a larger size of area, Within the area, there is a Hans Island existing dispute 





Figure 12-Limits of the Western European PSSA 
Source: Robert, J. (2007). Marine Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation: The 
Application and Future Development of the IMO’s Particularly Sensitive Sea Area Concept. 
 
3.4.3   PSSA Has a Problem of Intrinsic Benefit 
A sea area cannot get any additional protection solely from the designation of PSSA. 
What really plays a role in the environmental protection is the AMP adopted by IMO. 
Therefore, some scholars argue that PSSA is just providing a qualification and 
foundation for IMO to adopt relevant AMP (Gerard Peet, 1994). The problem could be 
observed in the process of designation Baltic Sea as a PSSA. At the time of submission 
of the PSSA proposal, the proposing States did not identify any new APMs to provide 
additional protection to the PSSA since this area had already taken many environmental 
protection measures adopted by IMO. It evoked a fierce controversy. Some states argue 
that the designation of PSSA without APMs cannot provide any effective protection 
measures better than previous measures, that makes it unnecessary to designate a PSSA. 
What is more, some scholars view the PSSA’s intrinsic benefit more negatively, 
describing PSSA as an “empty boat” and a “roof”, for the lack of intrinsic protection 
mechanism and under its framework using different tools to ensure compliance and 
enforcement (Detjen, 2006). 
 
The lack of intrinsic benefit of PSSA gives Arctic an optional shortcut, that is use the 
idea, designate the areas that need protection then take proper measures within the legal 
framework. In fact, numerous states have implemented routing measures for the 
purpose of environmental protection without going through the process and identifying 







CHAPTER 4: AAPC 
4.1   Identification of AAPCs 
4.1.1   The Application of PSSA Idea 
PSSA idea shall be applied in Arctic area, taking additional measures to protect Arctic 
from pollution especially from HFO pollution, bringing mariner’s attention on 
ecological significance of Arctic and rising the environmental protection awareness in 
Arctic. Like PSSAs, Arctic marine ecosystems host a vast array of over 2,000 species 
of algae, tens of thousands of microbes and over 5,000 animal species. Current 
estimates also suggest that many species are yet to be discovered (CAFF, 2014). The 
estimated number is shown in the table 8, even more species of algae and fishes than 
PERU which was designated as a PSSA by IMO in 2003. The Arctic area also meets 
the Social, cultural and economic criteria and Scientific and educational criteria of 
designation of PSSA. Like the PSSAs above, Arctic areas also have ecological, social, 
cultural and educational value as well as vulnerability to damage by international 
shipping traffic.  
 
Table 8-Estimated Number of Taxa within Arctic Seas  
Group Estimated number 
Bacteria 4,500-450,000 












4.1.2   Based on Hazard Identification 
To apply PSSA idea in Arctic, some AAPCs are identified in this paper for better 
drawing measures. Targeting at the hazard identified in Chapter 2, grounding, collision, 
hull/machinery, fire/explosion and ice damage which potentially cause HFO spill in 
Arctic, two categories of AAPCs shall be identified: high-traffic-risk areas and high-
ice-risk areas. While the fundamental objective of identifying AAPCs is to protect 
Arctic environment from HFO pollution, then the most vulnerable areas within Arctic 
should also be taken into consider, the third category of AAPC, ecologically sensitive 
areas.  
 
4.2   AAPC1 High-Traffic-Risk Area 
4.2.1   Four High-Traffic-Risk Areas 
Kara Gate, Russia north coast, Davis Strait between Canada and Greenland, southwest 
coast of Spitsbergen are four high-traffic-risk areas. 
 Kara Gate is the main shipping strait between the Barents and Kara seas (18 
nautical miles long, minimum depth of 21 meters) in north coast of Russia, has 
already established traffic separation scheme. 
 Russia northwest coast. This area consists of a series of narrow strait and shallow 
water. Both the Kara Sea and the Barents Sea are shallow, with an average depth 
of 90 meters and 10-100 meters along the southeastern coast respectively. 
Yugorskiy Shar Strait, the southernmost entrance from the Barents to Kara seas, is 
21 nautical miles long, 13-30 meters deep (AMSA, p. 23). Many ships have to pass 
through the shallow water and narrow strait instead the common ship route via 
Zhemaniya Cape because there are ports of Dikson, Dudinka and Sabetta. 
Therefore, the Ob Bay, Khalmyer Bay and River Mouth of Yenisei are extremely 
busy and of high density of ships especially in busy seasons. besides, this area is 
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preferred by a high-risk ship type—oil tankers and container vessels (HFO). The 
high-risk ships’ traffic map and ship density in busy season is shown in figure 13, 
thus this area is as high traffic risk. 
 
Figure 13- Traffic Map of High-risk Ship Types (Operating on HFO) and Ship Density 
in Russia Northwest Coast, 2012  
Source: Det Norske Veritas, HFO in the Arctic – Phase 2B, Report for PAME, DNV 
 
 Davis Strait between Canada and Greenland. It links Baffin Bay with the Labrador 
Sea and the North Atlantic. At its narrowest point Davis Strait is about 300 
kilometers wide; at its widest it is over 950 kilometers. There are five recognized 
routes through Canadian Arctic Archipelago via Northwest Passage, while all 
passages have common eastern and western approaches. In the east, ships must 
proceed through the Labrador Sea, Davis Strait and Baffin Bay (AMSA, p. 20). In 
addition, three main ports, Egedesminde, Godthab and, Sukkertoppen are located 
to the east of Davis Strait, among which the Godthab is the largest port of 
Greenland with oil tanker berth, making it a very busy in operating seasons. Shown 
in figure 14, it is a main route for HFO-fueled containers and ship density in 




Figure 14- Traffic Map of High-risk Ship Types (Operating on HFO) and Ship Density 
in Davis Strait, 2012 
Source: Det Norske Veritas, HFO in the Arctic – Phase 2B, Report for PAME, DNV 
 
 Southwest coast of Spitsbergen. A little different from the other three areas, the 
Spitsbergen, largest island and of the Svalbard archipelago in northern Norway, is 
occupied by ship types of oil tankers, reefers and passenger vessels operating on 
HFO, mainly because of the coal mining, permanently population and tourism on 
island. The vessel traffic is extremely busy from June to November. Figure 15 
shows the three types of ships’ traffic map near Southwest coast of Spitsbergen and 




Figure 15- Traffic Map of High-risk Ship Types (Operating on HFO) and Ship Density 
near Spitsbergen, 2012 
Source: Det Norske Veritas, HFO in the Arctic – Phase 2B, Report for PAME, DNV 
 
4.2.2   Characteristic of High-Traffic-Risk Area 
The four areas have common characteristics. 
 They are traffic concentration zones of high-risk ships. In detail, high-risk ships 
mean the ships with greatest HFO spill potential. Combing the accident frequency 
calculated by DNV (2.3.2) and study about dominant ship type of using HFO from 
ICCT (2.1.2), bulk carriers, containers and oil tankers adopt the most HFO in 
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Arctic and represent the highest spill risk.  
 They have high ship density especially in busy seasons. In Arctic, August and 
September normally experience the highest density of ships. In these two months, 
the traffic in the four areas is more busy than other areas in Arctic.  
 
DNV’s report has evaluated the accident-induced oil spill risk that each area is faced 
with. It shows that the riskiest area is Russian north coast, followed by Bering Strait, 
Canada/Greenland and Spitsbergen. See figure 16, in the bar graph, red indicates 
collision, green indicates fire/explosion, blue indicates hull/machinery and orange 
indicates grounding. It is observed that the traffic route of high-risk ship type and traffic 
density area in busy periods are basically coincident with high-risky areas. In addition, 




Figure 16-High-risk Area of Incidents Resulting Oil Spill 




4.2.3   Suggestions and Measures 
 Coastal States could establish traffic separation scheme, one of the elements of ship 
routing and widely used as APMs in PSSAs, in these high-traffic-risk areas, 
especially for ships operating without pilot ice assistance. Among these four areas, 
Kara Gate has already established traffic separation scheme. Traffic separation 
scheme would allow ships to follow well-defied lanes and separate opposing 
steams of traffic, whilst ensuring ships avoid the shoals and islands that lie close 
outside the traffic lane, thereby help to reduce the risks of collision and grounding 
of ships as well as the risk of HFO pollution arising from accidental oil spill.  
 Recommendatory track also could be used for ships’ safety navigation after 
conducting appropriate hydrographical survey, especially in the shallow water or 
narrow strait. Following the recommendatory, the risk of reef collision and 
grounding would be reduced. 
 
4.3   AAPC2 High-Ice-Risk Area 
4.3.1   An overview of Sea Ice  
Sea ice is simply frozen ocean water. It grows during the winter months and melts 
during the summer months, but some sea ice remains all year in certain regions 
(National Snow & Ice Data Center [NSIDC]). There are several parameters of sea ice 
that have impact on ship navigation safety. The ice type, thickness and concentration 
are factors that are most commonly considered to assess the risk during ice navigation.  
4.3.2   Significant Sea Ice Factors 
4.3.2.1   Type of Ice and Ice Thickness 
According to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the definition of ice type 




Table 9-Relationship between Ice Type and Ice Thickness 
Type of Ice Thickness of Ice 
New Ice New generated ice 
Nilas Nark Nilas Thickness≤5cm 
Light Nilas Thickness5-10cm 
The ice types above do not impact ship navigation 
Young 
Ice 
Grey Ice Thickness10-15cm 
Grey-White Ice Thickness15-30cm 
First-
Year Ice 
First-Year Thin Ice Thickness30-70cm 
First-Year Medium Ice Thickness70-120cm 
First-Year Thick Ice Thickness120-200cm 
Old Ice Second-Year Ice Melt remaining of at least one summer, >2.5m 
Multi-Year Ice Melt remaining of at least two summers, >3m 
Source: The Maritime Safety Administration of the People’s Republic of China. (2014). Guidance on 
Arctic Navigation in the Northeast Route, 2014. 
 
4.3.2.2   Ice concentration 
Ice concentration is a unitless term that describes the relative amount of area covered 
by ice, compared to some reference area. It typically is reported as a percentage (0 to 
100 percent ice), a fraction from 0 to 1, or sometimes in tenths (0/10 to 10/10). (NSIDC). 
It is an indicator to show how much difficult to navigate in ice region. Table 10 show 
the observation of different ice concentration and their impact on navigation. 
 
Table 10-Ice Concentration, Its Observation and Impact on Navigation 
Ice 
Concentration 
Ice Region Observation  Navigation  
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0/10 Ice Free 
 
Free Navigation 
<1/10 Open Water 
 




Cannot follow the 
planned course 







7/10~8/10 Close Pack 
 
 




assistance  10/10 Compact 
Ice/Consolidated Ice 
 
Source: The Maritime Safety Administration of the People’s Republic of China. (2014). Guidance on 
Arctic Navigation in the Northeast Route, 2014. 
4.3.3   Sea Ice-Induced HFO Spill Hazards  
The ice damage is not a formal risk category in the HIS Fairplay database, and this 
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category is more limited to what may be calculated based on the data (DNV, 2013). 
Although no oil spill volumes may be derived or reported until now, the ice indeed 
poses a significant threat on ships operating in Arctic. The Polar Code identified 8 
sources of hazards in Arctic shipping, among them ice is the primary one. 
Generally, sea ice may cause hull damage thus directly result oil spill.  
 Ship collides with ice when heading in high speed in sea region, which may damage 
ship bow and surrounding area. 
 Ship collides with under-water ice ridge or with ice on the edge of water channel, 
which may damage broadside, bilge side and bottom.  
 Ship goes astern in severe ice condition, which may cause stern damaged. 
 Ship is pushed around by moving ice, or get trapped in the moving ice thus under 
the high ice pressure, resulting a damage of parallel middle body. 
In addition to the structural failure mentioned above, there are some other ice-induced 
hazard would indirectly cause HFO spill. For example, loss of stability because of ice 
on ship superstructure, high corrosion rate resulted from friction between the hull and 
ice resulting, structure vibration caused by ice load or failure of systems because of ice 
ingestion from sea water, all these may direct hull damage of foundering, thus result in 
oil spill. 
 




Figure 17-Arctic Sea Ice Extent in Different Months 
Source: https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/charctic-interactive-sea-ice-graph/ 
 
Illustrated by figure 17, regardless of how the extent reduces with the years, the trend 
within one year by months is always the same: February to April experience the largest 
area of sea ice, then a downtrend shows up until lowest point in August and October, 
the best period for navigation in Arctic with more open water. However, even in the 
most seaworthy season, at least 15% of Arctic Sea is covered with ice.  
 
Obviously, the ships’ navigation is influenced by the ice regime, a general description 
of sea ice conditions, which is illustrated by figure 18. Averagely, August and 
September have the largest area of open water and almost all ships can navigate freely. 
While ice class ships have a longer operation period of more than eight months with 
the assistance of icebreaker, followed by other non-ice class ships with icebreaker 
assistance of six-months operation period. Ordinary ships without the assistance of 




Figure 18- Possible Navigation Season and Ships’ Navigational Capability 
Source: CCS. (2018). A Lecture about Polar Ship Navigation Regulation. 
 
4.3.5   High-Ice-Risk Areas 
4.3.5.1   One High-Ice-Risk Area On NWP 
The high-ice-risk area in NWP consists of three locations, shown in figure 19, 
respectively marked as location 1, 2 and 3.  
 Location 1, M’Clure Strait, 120 km wide at east end, 275 km long to Beaufort Sea, 
deep at over 400, experiences old ice of high concentration even in September. 
 Loction 2, Viscount Melville Sound, 100 km wide, 350 km long, experiences multi-
year and high concentration ice from M’Clure Strait.  
 Location 3, Victoria Strait, 120 km wide, at southern end is blocked by Royal 
Geographical Society Island, worst ice conditions along the mainland coast of 
Canada. 
The ice chart from Canada Ice Service shows that the northern coast of Greenland and 
northwest coast of the Canadian Archipelago also have severe ice conditions, but these 





Figure 19-Three Locations of High-Risk-Area on NWP and Their Ice Regime 
Source: http://iceweb1.cis.ec.gc.ca/CISWebApps/page1.xhtml?lang=en 
 
4.3.5.2   Four High-Ice-Risk Areas on NSR 
The operation condition of NSR is not as challenging as NWP but with higher risk, this 
is because more ships carrying or using HFO operate on NSR than NWP. And there are 
still 4 high-ice-risk areas which are illustrated by figure 20. The 4 dangerous areas are 
labeled as 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the upper right map, following the high-ice-risk area on NWP, 
and are respectively corresponding to the other 4 charts with same number. And the 
four charts give more specific information about ice development stage in June, 2018. 
 
 Area 2 is the south-western part and north-eastern part of Kara Sea. The whole 
Kara Sea has an ice concentration of more than 9/10 from December to April 
because Novaya Zemlya blocks the warm current (Maritime Safety Administration 
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[MSA], 2014, p. 84). In June, this area is covered with old ice and multi-year ice 
with a high concentration of 9-10/10. 
 Area3, the western part of the Laptev Sea, is covered with thick first-year ice in 
June. Even in September, there is an ice concentration of 4/10~5/10 between the 
east entrance of Vilkitskogo Strait and 76°N, forming an ice accumulation area in 
the east coast of Taymyr Peninsula (MSA, 2014, p.86). What is more, there is 
iceberg risk near the east coast of Severnaya Zemlya.  
 Area 4, northern-east part of the East Siberian Sea has a highest proportion of 
multi-year ice in winter (MSA, 2014, p. 85), with a large area of thick fist-year and 
some gray ice surrounded by open water in June, making the navigation condition 
more complicated.  
 Area 5 is northern-west part of Chukchi Sea. The Wrangel Island is surrounded by 
thick first-year ice and small area of multi-year ice.  
 





4.3.6   Suggestions and Measures 
 Pilot and icebreaker assistance. Pilot may give the ship master recommendations 
regarding assessment of ice conditions, selection of optimum route, ways of the 
maintenance of safe speed and distance to icebreaker or ship ahead when moving 
in convoy. While icebreaker makes channels in ice, a group of ships and allocation 
of ships follow the icebreaker, sailing of ship through the channel behind icebreaker 
in tow, without towing in the independent mode or within a group of ships. Both 
Russia and America require mandatory icebreaker and pilot assistance in some 
specific areas, but Canada may fail to provide pilot assistance at any time because 
of the limited number of icebreakers. 
 Set mandatory speed limitation according to ship ice class. Operating at a safe 
speed in high-risk waters can reduce likelihood of hull penetration in the event of 
an accident. Table 11 provides an optional speed for ships in different ice regime. 
Take ice class XUELONG as an example, its normal speed is 15 knots, and slow 
down to 12 knots when ice concentration is 3/10~4/10, to 8~10 knots when ice 
concentration is 5/10~6/10, to 3~5 knots when ice concentration is 8/10~10/10. 
Table 11-Optional Speed in Different Ice Regimes 
Ice regime Optional speed 
Ice concentration <4/10~5/10 Normal speed 
Ice concentration 6/10~7/10 Slow speed 
Night navigation in ice region Lower speed than daytime  
Poor visibility  Minimize speed to keep steering 
Source: MSA, Guidance on Arctic Navigation in the Northeast Route 2014 
 Detect sea bottom condition in key areas and designate anchorage area where 
condition is appropriate for ships in need of anchorage. For example, waiting for 
pilotage assistance. Designation of anchorage area could help to avoid ships anchor 
in wrong areas because of unfamiliarity with sea bottom condition, unfamiliarity 
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with the position and distance of iceberg around, drift direction and speed, etc. thus 
resulting grounding or collision with ice.  
4.4   AAPC 3- Ecologically Sensitive Areas 
4.4.1   The Criterion of Ecologically Sensitive Areas 
The ecologically sensitive areas could be incorporated into the Ecologically or 
Biologically Significant Areas (EBSAs), which was adopted by Conservation of Arctic 
Fluro and Fauna (CAFF). The EBSAs harbors Arctic species of populations and play 
an important role in protect the unique Arctic ecosystem. There are 11 EBSAs which 
are widely distributed in Arctic. Its criteria are similar to the criteria of PSSA, including:  
• Uniqueness or rarity 
• Special importance for life history stages of species 
• Importance for threatened, endangered or declining species and/or habitats 
• Vulnerability, fragility, sensitivity or slow recovery 
• Biological productivity 
• Biological diversity 
• Naturalness  
 
4.4.2   11 Ecologically Sensitive Areas and Their Significance 
The distribution of ecologically sensitive areas (figure 21) and their ecological 




Figure 21-Distribution of EBSAs in Arctic area 
Source：Ecologically or Biologically Significant Areas (EBSAs), CAFF 
Table 12-Description of EBSAs in Arctic Area 
Number Area Description  
① Coastal Waters of 
Chukotka 
An important area for aquatic birds to 
stage, moult and nest. In winter, coastal 
zone harbors ringed and bearded seals and 
their predators. 
② Wrangel-Gerald Shallows 
and Ratmanov Gyre 
A migratory pathway for bowhead whales, 
beluga whales, polar bears, Pacific walrus 
and gray whales. In winter, the polynyas 
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harbor ringed and bearded seals and their 
predators. 
③ Great Siberian Polynya Polar cod gather in this area, providing 
food for predators. Laptev polynyas 
support a chain of colonies of thick-billed 
murre and black-legged kittiwake mainly. 
The network also sustains seals, and draw 
its main predator, the polar bear. 
④ Ob-Enisei River Mouth The area supports globally threatened 
species like Steller’s eider, velvet scoter 
and long-tailed duck, harbors sea ducks, 
geese and swans, etc., and provides feeding 




The region is important for seabirds, polar 
bears, diverse zooplankton and polar cod, 
endangered bowhead whale, Atlantic 
walrus, and most of the world’s breeding 
population of the threatened ivory gull. 
⑥ Coast of Western and 
Northern Novaya Zemlya 
This area supports the largest seabird 
colonies in the North-East Atlantic. 
Threatened Steller's eider and longtailed 
duck stage and moult here. It also serves as 
an important feeding ground for Atlantic 
walruses.  
⑦ South-eastern Barents 
Sea (the Pechora Sea) 
This area provides food for sea ducks, 
walruses and stopover site for waterfowl 
species during their migrations. Beluga 
whales feed here and migrate via this area. 
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It supports the only European stock of 
Arctic cisco and is a migration area for the 
Pechora Atlantic salmon stock.  
⑧ Multi-year Ice of the 
Central Arctic Ocean 
The multi-year ice is important for polar 
bears southern and northern Beaufort Sea 
subpopulations to breed. 
⑨ White Sea It is migration routes of Atlantic salmon. It 
provides aquatic birds breeding grongd and 
eiders nesting areas. Sealsand feed, whelp 
and moult and beluga whales mate here. 
⑩ Murman Coast and 
Varanger Fjord 
It is used as a spawning area by several 
species of pelagic fishes, while the coast 
contains many seabird colonies. 
⑪ The Marginal Ice Zone 
and the Seasonal Ice-
Cover 
It is feeding areas for ice-associated 
species, providing habitat to breed, moult 
and rest for certain marine mammals.  
Source: https://www.caff.is/protected-and-important-areas/ebsas 
 
4.4.3   Suggestions and Measures 
Area to be avoided, one of ship routing’s elements, is an area within defined limits in 
which either navigation is particularly hazardous, or it is exceptionally important to 
avoid casualties, and which should be avoided by all ships, or by certain classes of ships 
(IMO). But designating all the 11 EBASs as areas to be avoided would significantly 
impair ships’ normal operation in Arctic, especially in busy seasons. So, the 11 EBSAs 
are categorized into three according to the annual ship densities in Arctic from DNV 
report and their relevant measures are shown in table 13. 
Table 13-Associated Measures of the Ecologically Sensitive Areas 
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Area  Description  Measures  
①, ②, ③, 
⑤ , ⑥  and 
⑪ 
These areas only have 
traffic in the busiest months 
approximately from July to 
October. 
Seasonal areas to be avoided could be 
established, allowing ships to operate in 
busy seasons excluding oil tankers, 
ships operating on HFO, etc. while 
prohibit ships to enter in off-peak 
seasons. 
④ and ⑦ These areas are essential 
even in the less operating 
seasons. 
Use recommendatory track, appropriate 
traffic separation scheme to reduce 
accidental pollution risk. 
⑨ and ⑧ These areas are barely 
affected by the vessel 
traffic even in the busiest 
seasons. 
They shall be designated as areas to be 
avoided, according to the navigation 
condition and applying to specific ships, 
for example, oil tanker above some 
specific tonnage or all ships operating 
















CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS 
HFO has posed a huge threat on Arctic environment. IMO is working on reducing the 
risk of HFO in Arctic. In addition to the Sulphur cap in 2020, the Arctic is expected 
to usher in an age with no HFO. Before a complete prohibition of HFO in Arctic, some 
mitigation measures are in urgent need. Although the Arctic area meets criteria of 
designation of PSSA, it would be a long process to adopt the Arctic as a PSSA, which 
makes it unreasonable as a transitional measure. Meanwhile, the lack of intrinsic benefit 
of PSSA offers Arctic an opportunity to select a shortcut—use PSSA idea, identify 
AAPCs to draw up navigational safety measures to protect Arctic environment. Since 
the main hazards that potentially result in oil spill are grounding, fire/explosion, 
hull/machinery, ice damage and collision, which happens approximately once 2.8 years, 
8.8 years once, 39 years once, 70 years once and 90 years once respectively. And in 
terms of ship types, bulk carriers, containers and oil tankers carry the most HFO and 
travel longest distances in Arctic, generating 4 high-traffic-risk areas and 4 high-ice-
risk areas. In addition to the 11 ecologically sensitive areas, a complete AAPC map is 
drawn.  
 
In PSSAs, the adopted APMs are normally ship routing, ship reporting, pilot assistance 
protecting environment from accidental pollution through enhancing navigation safety. 
There is little chance of operational pollution from ships under Polar Code, so the APM 
of PSSA could be applied to AAPCs to reduce accident risk. In 4 high-traffic-risk areas, 
separation scheme could be applied. In 5 high-ice-risk areas, Coastal States could adopt 
speed limitation, enhance icebreaker and pilot assistance. In 11 ecologically sensitive 
areas, perennial or seasonal area to be avoided could be established, especially for ships 
operating on HFO.  
 
This paper has some limitations. Specific ship routing measures, especially traffic 
separation scheme cannot be drawn up due to the lack of meteorological hydrological 
data. So, there are only an outline of suggestions and measures. Besides, the absence of 
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